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It has been only a decade and a half since the report of the
President's Committee on Administrative Management and only
a dozen years since the publication of the final report on Administrative Procedure in Government Agencies by the Attorney
General's Committee, but during this interim, administrative law
has come of age. Since 1947 the American Digest System has
carried an administrative law heading with the case collection
extending back to 1936 and, as Mr Parker chidingly notes, American Jurisprudence managed in 1942 to include it in the then current volume by prefixing "public" to administrative law. Through
the years the United States Code Annotated has been a source of
case material and some legislative history has there been collected
by agencies and subject matters. Since 1948 West Publishing
Company has published an excellent adjunct to the code in the
Congressional and Administrative News Service, with new legislation and administrative irules and rulings carried in full text as
they become available.
Easier access to some of this material has been had since
1936, when the Federal Register Act was enacted in answer to
judicial and congressional indignation over the rules carried to
the premises of the Panama Refining Company in the "hip pocket"
of Mr. Ryan.' Since 1946 and the congressional enactment of the
Administrative Procedure Act we have enjoyed the full impact
of a flood of federal agency procedures printed in the Federal
Register and the Code of Federal Regulations. Of the two looseleaf services which have sought to deal with this material on the
general level of administrative law, only Pike and Fischer has
survived to become a standard reference work. CCH, no longer
current, is useful now primarily for its carefully and minutely
detailed analysis of the 1941 report of the Attorney General's
Committee on Administrative Procedure.
While we have not had the advantage of the scholarship of
1. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
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pioneers Goodnow, Freund, and Frankfurter on these more recent
developments, at least in treatise form, there has nonetheless
been a steady stream of classroom and reference material from
government and commercial presses. There is now an abundance
of casebooks in the field and there are many special studies.
Of the three current works prepared in treatise form which
are here reviewed, Reginald Parker's is the most recent although
it is antedated by Kenneth Davis's work by a matter of only a
few months. The third work was written some ten years ago
by Frederick vom Baur of the New York City Bar but was rendered current after the enactment of the Federal Administrative
Procedure Act by the preparation of an extensive supplement
integrating the new statutory provisions into Vom Baur's treatment of pre-existing case law and special statutes. An introduction to the supplement was prepared by Dean Roscoe Pound.
As Professor Davis notes in his prefatory and introductory
remarks: "Possibly no other major field of law has been so long
The
so much in need of systematic statement of principles ....
field is still so unruly that one is sufficiently ambitious who
attempts to dig out and to organize the problems, to present such
law as is susceptible of summary, to discuss pros and cons, and to
contribute here and there to solutions ....
[A]s of the middle of
the century, the theory of separation of powers, while still guiding
the drafters of constitutions, has hardly any influence upon
administrative arrangements or activities.... The heavy emphasis is now upon the administrative process itself-rule making
and adjudication ....
In addition to adjudication procedures in
the narrow sense-what takes place in initiating and conducting
a proceeding-administrative law is concerned with problems of
collective or group decisions, commonly referred to as institutional decisions; bias of agencies and officers; separation of judging from other functions, such as investigating and prosecuting,
which may contaminate the judging function; substitutes for the
exclusionary rules of evidence; the extensive use of extra-record
information and understanding; findings, reasons, and stare decisis; and the binding effect of determinations." Thus Professor
Davis pitches his work primarily at the level of the administrative
process.
It is the administrative process which gets major emphasis
in Mr. Parker's work as well, with only very sketchy treatment
of judicial review. Thus in his prefatory pages Parker notes that:
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"Administrative law [in earlier years] was believed to be essentially the law of judicial review-of court control against administrative excess. Living and teaching in the middle of the twentieth century, however, the author views administrative law in a
different light. He thinks of it as law that 'protects' not only citizens but also the government as well. The book, then, shows the
limits placed upon the individual and the executive branch of
the government. The government is to be for the people and it
can function only through law. That the executive branch may
do so in an adequate fashion is the concern of administrative law."
Implementation of the rather enigmatically stated description of
administrative law as law "protecting the government" as well as
citizens appears to lie in the author's fairly close analysis, in
treating judicial remedies and elsewhere, of the rules which the
judiciary has imposed upon itself against undue interference with
the administrative process.
Only ten years earlier, Mr. vom Baur, in the opening paragraphs of his treatise, set the stage for a treatment of administrative law almost wholly in terms of judicial review by noting
that: "The real heart of the field appears to lie in . . . the rules
governing the validity of the acts and conduct of the administrative agents of the government. This is the one homogeneous
branch of the subject ....
[T]he great bulk of [these] principles
of law governing acts of public agents are established in litigated
cases, and these arise, with rare exceptions, only where asserted
private interests are affected. It is obvious that the heart of the
field, and the reason for its existence, lies in the assertion of
private rights [on judicial review]."
On the basis of the rightness of his analysis, Vom Baur devotes possibly ten per cent of his treatise to formal consideration
of the administrative process and proceedings and substantially
the remainder to the principles and prestidigitations of judicial
review. Mr. Parker, on the other hand, endeavoring as he says
"to present administrative law as a part of modern public law,"
reverses the process and devotes only some ten per cent of his
work to the formally headed topic of judicial review. It seems
apparent that work which slight either judicial review or administrative process and procedure to the extent indicated can hardly
qualify as general treatises on administrative law. Professor
Davis's work, on the other hand, approaches expectation of a
balanced treatise on the subject in its modern development, devot-
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ing as he does about a third of his text to problems of judicial
review and about two-thirds of it to the administrative process
and proceedings.
Currently, of course, the central fact in federal administrative law, with which these works are mainly concerned, is the
history and enactment of the Federal Administrative Procedure
Act in 1946. What they contain by way of comment and analysis
of the crucial provisions of the 1946 Act is, as a consequence, a
fair criterion of the function these books will serve, or continue
to serve, in the practitioner's or law school's library.
Thus Vom Baur, the traditionalist, finds the heart of administrative law in the principles of judge-made law resulting from
litigation. He finds "the backbone of administrative law" in the
doctrines of "the supremacy of law and separation of powers." A
paucity of modern judicial support for at least a part of his backbone is evidenced by the fact that he finds it necessary to cite the
St. Joseph Stockyards case2 thirty-four times and Crowell v.
Benson 3 forty-two times. However, Vom Baur has no difficulty
in finding in the 1946 act categorical reaffirmance of the proposition (in Section 10 of Judicial Review) that, "Under the supremacy of law embodied in Article III of the Constitution, the ordinary
courts are empowered to control government officials and agencies to the extent of holding them to the law." While he cites
Dicey's "nine editions" in support of his position, he neglects to
point out that even the man who wrote the introduction to the
last of the nine editions has stated that Dicey's thesis needs modification. As might be expected, Vom Baur is content merely to
quote, largely without analysis, the bulk of the act, devoted as it
is to regulating the administrative process directly rather than
through judicial review.
Parker's opinion of the 1946 act is best exemplified in his own
rather pungent phrasing: "Some opponents greeted the new law
with the same undiluted antipathy with which they had opposed
the prior bills. Most critics, however, were more or less satisfied
with the comparatively small innovations the Act has brought
about. This acquiescence, of course, contrasts somewhat with
the attitude of the admirers of the law, which was repeatedly
hailed as 'the most important statute affecting the administration
of justice in the federal field since the passage of the Judiciary
2. St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38 (1936).
3. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
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Act of 1789.'.. . [A] more temperate investigation reveals, indeed,
that the Act's chief merit lies in the fact that it has refrained from
any telling innovation.. .. [T] he APA is anything but a codification of administrative procedure. . . ." Mr. Parker amply demonstrates the extent to which the act does not supplant case law,
particularly in his two excellent and exhaustive chapters on
"administrative regulations and interpretations" and "administrative decisions."
One of the permanent values of the Davis work is its careful
analysis and documentation of the forces which finally culminated
in the enactment of the APA in 1946. Particularly is this so of his
treatment of the separation of functions and adjudication sections
of the act which are even more "hilariously complicated" than the
recent amendments to Section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act. It is
possible to make the provisions intelligible only in the context of,
on the one hand, determined opponents' attempting to "kill the
institutional decision" and, on the other, highly persuasive administrative considerations militating against such a result. Professor Davis succeeds in holding the welter of gossamer-thin distinctions in focus throughout his able commentary on this attempt
to emasculate the administrative process by transferring a staggering burden of agency decisional work from the usually capable
but anonymous agency "staff" to the often limited competence of
an identifiable "examiner." The compromise which Congress has
attempted by providing for the separation of investigating and
deciding functions within an agency (but not at the top of the
agency), the shielding of initial licensing and rule-making from
even this degree of separation, the later congressional adoption of
separation of functions even at the top of the agency in the case
of the National Labor Relations Board, all this is etched out with
consummate skill. Not a little of the wealth of delightfully
enlightened comment consists of pointing the way for interpretation of numerous ambiguities so as to accomplish the legislative
purpose of fair play and at the same time not impose crippling
procedures upon the agencies.
Mr. Parker, by virtue of the organization of his book, treats
the subject of separation of functions and the institutional decision
under two widely separated major topics, first under a sub-part
devoted to the organization of the agencies and second under a
sub-part devoted to the procedural requirements of a valid administrative decision. I think the result is that the subjects do not get
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a fully satisfying analysis in either place although it is tantalizingly clear that Mr. Parker could readily supply such analysis
had he time to stop and do so. For example, he notes that "there
is certainly no federal agency whose hearing officers would not
indulge in the practice of consulting with their assistants" despite
the implications of the proscription in Section 5 (c) of the APA
that "no such officer shall consult any person or party on any fact
in issue unless upon notice ..... " Yet he is content to let the matter
rest with a reference to the Attorney General's commentary on
the act which "boldly asserts" that permitting the hearing officer
to engage with appropriate agency personnel in an analytical
discussion of the record is thoroughly consistent with the purposes
of the act. In Davis, on the other hand, you find a carefully
worked out interpretation of the statutory language supporting
the notion that such consultation was intended by Congress,
annotated with a full array of references to legislative sources
and other comment. Parenthetically, the immeasurable damage
which would be done to the quality of agency adjudication at the
examiner level by a contrary interpretation is a measure of the
irresponsibility of the 1944 proposal of the American Bar Association which would have categorically prohibited any consultation-even with the examiner's own law clerk-if the proposal
had been literally interpreted.
Vom Baur is of little help in understanding the ebb and flow
of the contest over limiting the administrative process which
culminated in the enactment of the APA. Since the objective of
his treatise is, as has been noted, primarily to present an orderly
treatment of the judge-made principles of administrative law
and particularly the law of judicial review, the work provides a
Procrustean bed into which the crucial provisions of the APA can
be fitted only painfully at best. Nonetheless, his work has continuing value for the practitioner, for it contains all that hoary
body of principle which would endow the administrative agency
with a status in some respects more limited than that of the jury.
In both the federal and state judiciaries these principles, presented with sufficient eloquence still win occasional cases at the
district court level and sometimes in the higher echelons as well.
Vom Baur has included a convenient collection of statutory provisions for judicial review of administrative action and requisite
forms in connection therewith.
But for genuine understanding of the legislative and judicial
developments which comprise current administrative law, there
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is as yet no collection and commentary approaching that which
Professor Davis has supplied. Developments in the field of fact
finding, particularly problems as to the use of the common-law
rules of evidence and judicial and official notice are well presented. There is also a very useful section on the judicial difficulties with the development of new law by case to case adjudication as exemplified in the Chenery litigation.4 A highly critical
treatment of Justice Jackson's dissent in the last round of the
litigation loses some of its effectiveness, however, by reason of a
failure to get the issue clearly joined-Professor Davis overlooked
the fact that the Securities and Exchange Commission withdrew
the opinion containing the ad hoc general principle with which
he confounded Justice Jackson and thereafter issued an opinion
containing, in effect, only a statutory finding of unfairness and
inequitableness founded on "undispelled doubts." 5 Justice Jackson might more accurately have been criticized for failing to
follow the then undisturbed principle of non-review of mixed
questions of law and fact which he had hewed out in the Dobson case."
Parker's swiftly-moving commentary contains much penetrating insight but suffers from either publisher or author impatience to "get on with the job." Perhaps the explanation for the
sparseness which characterizes much of Parker's treatment lies
in the extent to which there is reliance upon Hans Kelsen for the
theoretical background of the subject and a preoccupation with
the limitations which Kelsen has imposed upon the legal scientist
against attempting to influence the law-making process by recom7
mending a particular meaning of a legal norm.
"Recommending to the legal authority one of the different
meanings of a legal norm," however characterized as to its polit4. S.E.C. v. Chenery Corporation, 318 U.S. 80 (1943); 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
5. In the Matter of Federal Water Service Corporation, 18 S.E.C. 231

(1945)

replacing In the Matter of Federal Water Service Corporation, 15

S.E.C. 849 (1944).
6. Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489 (1943).

7. ".

.

. the task of a legal scientist interpreting a legal instrument is to

show its possible meanings and to leave it to the competent legal authority
to choose in accordance with political principles the one which this authority
thinks the most appropriate. In showing the possibilities which the law to

be applied opens to the legal authority, the legal scientist scientifically serves
the law-applying function; and in revealing the ambiguity, and thus the
necessity for improving the wording, he serves the law-creating function in
a scientific way. If the legal scientist recommends to the legal authority
one of the different meanings of a legal norm, he tries to influence the lawmaking process and exercises a political, not a scientific function ..
Science and Politics, 45 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 641 (1951).

" Kelsen,
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ical or scientific function, is, on the other hand, a task which Professor Davis welcomes and vigorously performs-to the great
enrichment of his treatise.
Addendum
Special legal studies in the recent past include one from the
press of the University of Michigan entitled Administrative Agencies and the Courts, by Frank E. Cooper, 1951, pp. 470, $5.00, and
one published in London by Sir Isaac Pitman & Sons, Ltd., entitled
American Administrative Law, by Bernard Schwartz, 1950, pp.
144, $4.75. The subject also has been treated generally from the
political scientist's point of view in Federal Administrative Law,
by Rinehart John Swenson, The Ronald Press Company, New
York, 1952, pp. 376, $6.00, and specially in Administration of
National Economic Control, by Emette S. Redford, The Macmillan
Company, New York, 1952, pp. 403.
West Publishing Company has now published its second current treatise in the field, Federal Administrative Law, by Urban A.
Lavery, 1952, pp. 518. Sampling it leads me to hazard the view
that it contains a great deal more "damnation of the darkness"
and much less "lighting of candles" in this troubled field than the
work of either Professor Davis or Mr. Parker.
Melvin G. Dakin*
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.

